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Title Professional Wargaming: A Flawed 
but Useful Tool 
John Curry 
Abstract 
Rationale for the Article. Professional wargames have long been an integral part of the tool set used by 
the military. The literature includes many examples of wargames that have been successful in terms of 
training, military education, procurement, operational analysis and planning for war. However, 
retrospective examination demonstrates that many of these professional wargames also had major errors 
in them and by implication current games about future confrontations are similarly flawed. 
Nevertheless, the academic evidence is clear that such games are still invaluable tools. 
Methodology. Ten years of research into the development of wargames undertaken by the History of 
Wargaming Project has analysed and made generally available more professional wargames than ever 
before. Retrospective examination of a sample of these declassified games, from the British War Office 
Rules (1896) to more recent games about the Ukraine, shows significant errors. Value. Demonstrating 
that professional games had errors in the past opens challenges the overconfidence in the predictive 
capacity of games. It also raises the possibility for future research to identify game design bias and to 
develop better games in the future. Understanding the value of better games, even with their inherent 
issues, raise the possibility of better preparing decision makers for the future. 
Notes. The words wargame and game are used interchangeably in this article. Whilst the techniques 
used in professional gaming evolved from modelling the battlefield, modern professional gaming is 
increasingly focussed on other situations that are not war, such as state level confrontations, trade wars, 
politics, cyber conflict, banking crisis etc. Using the term wargame seems inappropriate when for 
example, gaming a shipping dispute. All the games referred to this article, unless otherwise noted, are 
professional wargames, used by military, government, public sector bodies and other parties directly 
involved in real world issues. The prefix professional has been omitted for brevity in most places. 
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Background 
As of 2019, the importance of professional wargaming in NATO and allied nations is clearly on the 
rise. There has been a whole series of professional wargaming handbooks published; these include the 
US Navy’s wargaming handbook (Burns et al., 2015), the United States Army War College Strategic 
Wargaming Series handbook (U.S. Army War College, 2015), the UK’s Ministry of Defence 
Wargaming Handbook (MOD, 2017) and the German Army handbook (Birnstiel et al., 2006). It should 
be noted that there are gaps in the professional coverage, for example there is currently no equivalent 
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wargaming handbook for the United States Air Force. Other nations, with different military traditions, 
are striving to develop a wargaming capacity. An example of such a trend can be found in China, where 
computer-based wargames have been used to help teach senior commanders and their staff to work 
together, while junior leaders and soldiers are using first person shooter commercial games technology 
to learn about low level combat (Dunnigan, 2015).There have also been academic wargaming 
handbooks published that have focussed on individual methods such as Matrix Games (Curry & Price, 
2014) and Confrontation Analysis (Curry & Young, 2017). New games are increasingly focussed on a 
wide range of situations beyond the military, such as issues around trade, banking, disaster relief etc. 
A rare photograph showing the Chinese army playing a wargame. The Chinese military cadets are 
playing a platoon level kriegsspiel. The opposing teams have their back to the other in order to conceal 
their plans Source Curry, J. & Price, T., (2016). The Sandhurst Kriegsspiel, Wargaming for the Modern 
Infantry Officer, Training for War: Volume 1 Morrisville, NC: History of Wargaming Project. 
Successful Wargames 
One of the key potential benefit of professional wargaming driving its promulgation around the world 
has been succinctly summarised by the phrase “Wargames can save lives.” by Colonel Matt Caffrey 
(2019, p. 277). Caffrey has been the wargames coordinator at the Air Force Research Laboratory at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio and a founder of Connections, an annual series of professional 
wargaming Conferences that have spread around the world (Connections UK, 2019). The argument that 
“Wargames can save lives” is supported by numerous anecdotal examples from the last eighty years of 
military history (Caffrey, 2019). 
There have numerous well documented examples of successful wargames. Successful being defined as 
having training value, developing new tactics or for operational analysis which informed decision 
making. The recent book On Wargaming published by the United States War College comprehensively 
documented numerous examples of wargames having been an invaluable tool in the development of 
[images have been redacted from this version of the article]
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equipment, tactics, national strategy and operational practise during actual conflicts (Caffrey, 2019). 
Many other authors, such as Perla (1990), Allen (1987), Wilson (1968) and (Smith, 2009), support this 
contention. The three examples are outlined below as representative of the many potential case studies 
in the literature. 
A classic example of a successful tactical wargame that had a strategic impact was the Western 
Approaches Tactical Game run by Captain Gilbert 1942-45 (Williams, 1979). This trained convoy and 
escort ship commanders in anti-U-boat tactics during the critical convoy battles in the Atlantic during 
World War II. Later commentary on these games present it as only a single game (Strong, 2017), but 
Gilbert actually ran three types of games. The first was for the purposes of operational analysis, re-
enacting recent U-boat attacks on convoys on the floor. Based on after action accounts of the escorts, 
Gilbert and his team of wrens deduced where the attacking U-boats could have been during the attacks 
and then statistically worked out the best tactic to maximize the chance of the escorts catching the 
attacking U-boat. The second type of game run by Gilbert was for training purposes, teaching various 
nationality escort commanders to apply these new tactics. The effectiveness of the new tactics in the 
actual Battle of the Atlantic were then then subsequently assessed on the wargames floor, leading to a 
Kolb type cycle of learning (Kolb, 1983). Gilbert and his team developed a new tactic, it was taught to 
ship captains and then their actual experiences at sea informed Gilbert’s future work. The third type of 
game was to answer a strategic question, with a map game mimicking the actual Battle of the Atlantic 
with the aim of working out if the proposed plan Escort Groups (naval support groups) rushing to 
support convoys under attack would actually work (it did) (Strong, 2017). The games were recognised 
as having a major impact on Allied success in the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic (MOD, 2017). 
TACSPIEL, is an example of a tactical wargame used in 1966 for operational analysis during the 
Vietnam War (Curry, 2011a). It played an important role in improving the effectiveness of American 
Army counter-insurgency techniques. A Tacspiel game typically took two days to play just thirty 
minutes of simulated combat. The analysts would examine a situation such as an American infantry 
company being ambushed, then look at all the available evidence to identify the best response. This 
response then informed training and doctrine. While time consuming and resource intensive, the 
evidence was clear that these wargames and others from the same time period had a significant impact 
on the battlefield (Allen, 1987; Wilson, 1968). 
A more recent example of a successful game was NATO using a computer assisted wargame, the Peace 
Operations Support Model. This was reported as being used twice in 2011 for commanders and their 
planning staff to visualise the transition campaign plan for Afghanistan. The wargame was seen as 
successful and was used as a case study in the MOD Wargaming Handbook (MOD, 2017). As stated 
above it would be possible to propose extensive lists of games that have been cited as successful in 
meeting the aims of the game designers. However, the three examples above, one for World War II, 
one for the Vietnam War and one for recent operations in Afghanistan, are sufficient to demonstrate 
that literature has confidence that the wargames often achieved the game sponsors aims. 
Early Wargames: Experience Informed the Games 
Modern professional wargames are direct descendants of some of the Prussian Kriegsspiel games of the 
19th and 20th centuries. Initially, Kriegsspiel was a complex map-based training tool used by the 
Prussian army (Peterson, 2012). The key game mechanic was the players on each side were only told 
by the umpires what they could see from their simulated troop positions on the paper map. Outcomes 
of player decisions were determined by the umpires based on consulting detailed books of rules. The 
rules were based on extensive investigation into what were then recent battles and wars. To run the 
game required umpires—and to a lesser extent the players— to invest extensive preparation time and 
effort. Around 1870, the so called free kriegsspiel was introduced by Verdy du Vernois as an alternative 
(Verdy du Vernois, 1870 cited in Curry, 2011b). This method dispensed with many of the formal rules 
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and relied on a ready source of umpires with practical experience of actual combat in the recent past. 
As a result, the games could be conducted a lot faster, were more interesting and could 
be run more frequently (Griffith, 2009). 
Bellum, was a British simplified variant of the German Kriegsspiel. Figure 2 shows a sketch from the 
Illustrated London News, March 6th, 1909 (Curry, 2013). The movements of the other side are 
concealed at this stage of the game by the screen between the players. Relying on a good umpires’ 
judgements rather than extensive books of rules accelerate the pace of the game and players were then 
more focussed on tactical decisions making rather than the rules. Of course, a poor umpire who 
focussed on a too rigid implementation of the rules or who saw the games as an opportunity to present 
their ideas, could reduce the training value by destroying the player’s immersion. Source Time Life 
Magazine 1915 reproduced from Curry, J., (2013). The British Kriegsspiel (1872) Including RUSI’s 
Polemos (1888), Early Wargames 2 (Morrisville, NC: History of Wargaming Project). 
While the rules behind the Prussian kriegsspiel were based on recent combat experience, some other 
early wargames included what were, with the benefit of historical hindsight, to visualize the effects of 
new technologies on the lessons of even relatively recent experience. The British Army War Office War 
Game (War Office, 1896, cited in Curry, 2011b) is a good example. Two extracts from the umpire’s 
guidelines on the use of cavalry illustrate this. “A frontal attack on [artillery] guns will entail heavy 
loss, but should not be considered impracticable.” War Office (1896, p. 11, cited in Curry, 2011b). 
“Against unshaken infantry a deep formation and an attack steadily conducted and carried through is 
required. Should the ground not admit of a screened approach or of surprise, then the cavalry must pass 
quickly over the fire swept ground. Cavalry attacks will always be productive, when successful, of 
heavy loss to the infantry.” War Office (1896, p. 12, cited in Curry, 2011b). 
The British experience from the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854 during the Crimean War 
was not reflected in the rule about cavalry charging deployed artillery from the front. Although the 
Light Brigade reached the guns in the Battle of Baclava, they were forced to rapidly withdraw and so 
had taken heavy casualties for no military gain. Similarly, cavalry charging infantry proved to be almost 
consistently a grave tactical error during the opening battles of World War I. The impact of these 
training games on the initial poor performance of the British Army in the Boer War (1899-1902) has 
been commented upon, but not yet researched (Caffrey, 2019). The popular and professionally respected 
Fred Jane Naval Wargame that was widely played between 1898 and 1918 (Jane et al., 2014) and the 
1916 Chamberlaine Coastal Artillery wargame failed to acknowledge the risk of critical hits 
(Chamberlaine, 1916). They would be aware of this possibility, but it is currently speculation why they 
[images have been redacted from this version of the article]
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decided not to include this risk in their rules. Occasionally, even powerful ships could suffer 
catastrophic damage where a single hit could find a weak spot in the design or a failure of training or 
procedures could lead to a fire that would sink the ship rapidly. At the 1916 Battle of Jutland, a failure 
in gunnery procedures that emphasised speed, encouraged Royal Navy crews to leave the anti-flash 
doors open and to adopt unsafe practises for storing cordite in corridors during battles (Friedman, 2015). 
The cordite caught fire easily and the open doors allowed the explosive cordite gases (flash over) to 
spread in moments. These errors directly lead to the loss of three capital ships and the loss of 3,309 
sailors at the Battle of Jutland (Brooks, 2016). There were clearly differences between the Fred T. Jane’s 
game and Chamberlain’s game and the experience of naval warfare in World War I. However, currently 
there has been no academically published research relating the experience of these games on officer 
training to subsequence experience in the war.  
US Naval War College Interwar War Games 
In the time period between World War ending in 1918 and America’s entry into World War II in 1941, 
the US Naval War College (NWC) at Newport made extensive use of gaming as the framework for the 
coursework during that period. These games have been widely referenced as exemplars of good practise 
of the use of wargames as part of the training and analysis cycle of learning (Lillard, 2016; MOD, 2017). 
The most commonly used evidence to support this assertion was a speech to the Naval War College in 
1950, Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet for WWII, who said: “The war 
with Japan had been re-enacted in the game room here by so many people and in so many different 
ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise – absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze 
tactics towards the end of the war; we had not visualised those”. (MOD, 2017, p. 4) The inter war NWC 
games, including naval exercises at sea (fleet problems), have been well documented by surviving 
records such as the comprehensive work of Nofi (2010) and more summative work of Lillard (2016). 
The literature demonstrates that the leadership of the navy placed value in these games by the sheer 
scale of the effort put into them. As part of wider research on the history of naval wargaming, I have 
recreated played many of the professional naval wargames between 1873 and 1945 (Jane et al., 2014). 
My experience challenged the accepted confidence in the accuracy of these wargames. While these 
NWC games simulated many aspects that were in evidence in the subsequent naval war in the Pacific, 
some elements were incorrect. The major discrepancies are summarised in the table below. One of the 
surprises of the actual war was the Japanese development of the Type 93 Long Lance torpedo. Until 
1943, it was not realised that the Japanese had a torpedo that had a range comparable to the gunnery 
range of a cruiser and the American navy attributed the torpedo hits on their cruisers to Japanese 
torpedo-submarine traps (the Japanese MOD 2 torpedo was introduced in 1936 and had a range of 
20,000 metres and carried a 490kg warhead (Friedman, 2015). It should be noted that this was not the 
fault of the game developers in the Naval War College, but a failure of intelligence. The rule writers 
could not include weapons that they were unaware of. These are precisely the sorts of failures of 
knowledge and understanding that lead to flawed predictions. Technical surprises can have drastic 
effects on both tactics and outcomes 
However, an argument based on the rules alone—rather than on the actual game results, reports, and 
analyses—would be flawed. The games designer writing rules had to cover the full range of potential 
fleet engagements, even if they did not think that situation was likely. Lillard’s (2016) work showed 
that the wargames played were often using scenarios that were different from the subsequent war in the 
Pacific. Of course, sometimes the games were designed to represent less likely scenario’s in order to 
force the participating officers to innovate when faced by the unexpected, but overall the scenarios 
demonstrated some misunderstandings about the nature of a future war. Despite these issues Friedman 
stated that it was likely that the games, using the students as researchers, made a vital difference in 
tactical and strategic innovation  
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NWC War College Game 1936 rules and 
scenarios 
Actual Pacific War 1941-45 
Anticipated decisive major fleet action between 
capital ships (aka Jutland 1916) 
Battles dominated by air power and involved 
numerous smaller actions 
Most gunnery actions by day Most gunnery actions by night and Japanese 
proficiency at night fighting 
Centralised command and control of fleets which 
is well suited to gunnery actions 
Decentralised control was required when faced 
by sudden catastrophic torpedoes hits that 
changed the battle in moments 
Aircraft had a minor role Aircraft had major role 
The concept of Convoys was absent from these 
games 
Convoys were important 
Failure to understand the Japanese Long Lance 
torpedo and its effects on surface battle 
Table 1. Comparison of the United States Naval War College Wargame Rules (1936) and actual 
experience in the naval actions in the Pacific Theatre in World War II 1941-45. Curry & Carlson, 
2019). 
Failure to understand the Japanese Long Lance torpedo and its effects on surface battle (Friedman, 
2017). After criticism of the games based on examination of the rules and scenarios used (Curry, 2018), 
the latest wargaming books have presented a more balanced view of these wargames; the Naval War 
College games had errors in them, but were still very useful (Caffrey, 2019). 
Fletcher Pratt was a well-known writer and respected naval wargaming hobbyist. He developed a set of 
floor-based wargaming rules, The Fletcher Pratt Naval Wargame, which became popular among literary 
and academic elites during the 1930s. With intellectual players such as Isaac Asimov, Sprague de Camp 
and other famous participants, Fletcher Pratt himself and others, it enjoyed success with weekly games 
in a New York ballroom during World War II between 1941-45 (Curry & Pratt, 2012; Featherstone, 
1965.). Pratt enjoyed access to the NWC games and serving naval officers played the game, notably on 
one occasion, the Commanding Officer for the USN South Atlantic played with his staff (Curry and 
Pratt 2012). The game produced valid military insights. For example, when the Royal Navy committed 
a heavy cruiser and two light cruisers against a German pocket battleship at the Battle River Plate the 
accepted professional wisdom was that the cruisers might be lost. The Pratt game found that the cruisers 
would fight the pocket battleship to a standstill as happened in reality (Featherstone, 1965). Other 
insights included the realisation that the anti-aircraft gunnery was insufficient to stop enemy air attack, 
only fighter-based air defence tactics could do that. The Pratt players realised the importance of staying 
in formation in complex actions to avoid being engaged by friendly forces in the confusion. The Pratt 
games mimicked the United States Navy practise of attempted to keep centralised command, but they 
soon realised that in naval actions spread over vast distances, junior commanders needed to operate 
with a great deal of autonomy (Curry & Pratt, 2012). This was an interesting example of a hobby game 
that offered accurate insights, but that was not appreciated widely at the time. 
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Original Sketches of the Fletcher Pratt naval wargame. Top sketch shows the player estimating range 
and direction. The bottom sketch shows Pratt and his wife measuring the range. The game had the 
unusual game mechanic of estimating range in inches for gunnery. It was a reasonable simulation of 
the fire control systems in use, and encouraged players to use ‘ladders’ of shells to determine the range 
of an enemy target. Once the target was straddled, the range had been ‘found’. The target would then 
try to disrupt this by turning (usually towards the firing ship) as happened in real life. This actually 
introduced a diceless way of randomising gunnery due to the issues of accurately estimating the range 
in inches for targets up to 350 inches away. Source the Fletcher Pratt Naval Wargame (1934) 
reproduced in Pratt F. & Curry J. (2013) Fletcher Pratt’s Naval Wargame: Wargaming with model 
ships 1900-1945 (Morrisville, NC: History of Wargaming Project, 2013). 
[images have been redacted from this version of the article]
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Cold War, Gaming the Central Front 
The Cold War lasted between 1947-1991, and was a period of geopolitical tension between Russia (and 
allies), and the United States (and allies). A key focus of tension was the land border between East and 
West Germany in Europe, where two heavily armed camps faced each other. On a number of occasions, 
tensions escalated between the two power blocks and a potential consequence could have been a war in 
Europe. The outcome of the conventional war would have been decided by a Russian invasion of 
Europe. Such a potential war was extensively modelled and wargamed by NATO members as part of 
the preparation for such a conflict (Caffrey, 2019). It would be anticipated that developments in 
operational analysis, historical analysis and wargaming would have created wargame models that were 
more accurate in predicting future combat than previous generations of wargames. Wargames were 
used at the tactical, operational and strategic level, in all domains from land, sea and air. For clarity, the 
first example is the tactical hit probabilities used for tank combat, focused mainly on the wide disparities 
of the estimates across the various games in the case study. The disparity in the probabilities used in at 
the tactical levels are clear and require no appreciation of military history to understand the point being 
made.  
As part of extensive analytical research by the History of Wargaming Project, it is now possible to 
directly compare estimated performance in the different sets of wargaming rules. The selection 
examined were published between 1976 and 1984, the height of the Cold War as shown in Table 2. 
Rule Set Date 
published 
Notes 
FIREFIGHT 1976 USA, designed by James Dunnigan, the game development was 
funded by the USA Army and a declassified version of the game 
was also published shortly afterwards. There were limited 
differences between the classified and unclassified versions of 
the game (Allen, 1987) 
DUNN KEMPF 1977 USA, the game mechanisms were a development of the hobby 




1978 UK, written in 1968 to game a war in 1978. 
CONTACT! 1980 Canadian development of the Dunn Kempf game mechanisms 
BLOCK BUSTER 1984 USA- fighting in built up areas 
Table 2. Cold War Tactical Games (now declassified). 
The following three examples were selected as they were comparing apparently exactly the same 
weapons/ situation as shown in table 3, table 4 and table 5. No understanding of tank combat is required 
to see that the estimated performance varied widely. There were also many subtler differences that were 
revealed during modern playtesting of the declassfied rules, such as the time required to carry out the 
same actions.  
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Situation: A Russian T62 tank (with a 115mm gun) firing at a UK Chieftain tank that is stationary at 
a range of 750 metres range. 
Rule Set Combined P(hit) and P(kill) 
percentage 
Notes 
BRITISH ARMY DESERT 
WARGAME 
96% Single shot 
FIREFIGHT 69% 40 second turn 
length 
CONTACT! 50% 30 seconds turn 
length 
DUNN KEMPF 6% 30 seconds turn 
length 
Table 3: Tank Combat, probabilities vary between 6% and 96% 
USA TOW (anti-tank missile) firing at a Russian T62 tank that is stationary at a range of 750 metres 
range. 
Rule Set Combined P(hit) and P(kill) 
percentage 
Notes 
FIREFIGHT 83% 40 second turn length 
CONTACT! 50% 30 seconds turn length 
DUNN KEMPF 26% 30 seconds turn length 
Table 4: anti-tank guided missile, probabilities vary between 26% and 83% 
In order to increase their survival chances on the battlefield, armour often try to conceal themselves 
behind slopes to reduce the amount of the vehicle that can be hit. The military refer to this as the vehicle 
being hull-down (the American military call this defilade). 
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Example of tank being seen through a weapon site. Screen shot from VIRTUAL BATTLE SPACE 1 
(Bohemia Interative,2010). 
Example of tank that is hull down (defilade) being seen through a weapon site. Screen shot from 
VIRTUAL BATTLE SPACE 1 (Bohemia Interative,2010). 
[images have been redacted from this version of the article]
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Defensive advantage for being a tank being hull down (defilade) i.e. reduce the chance of being seen 
and destroyed by an attack 
Rules Combined reduction in chance of being hit P(hit) and destroyed P(kill) 
FIREFIGHT 42% 
BLOCK BUSTER 30% 
DUNN KEMPF 10% 
CONTACT! 10% 
Table 5: The defensive advantage of being hull down varies between 10% and 42% 
This article does not compare the various game kill probabilities with real results, as this would require 
a separate article to meaningfully examine issues around data from actual combat. Such an article would 
also require detailed military knowledge on ballistics. In summary, one of the issues with wargaming 
is calculating the chance of hitting the target and having an impact (so called effective fire). Rowlands 
(2006) in his book The Stress of Battle uses historical analysis set against analysis of training to conclude 
that shooting performance in live military operations was an order of magnitude worse than even the 
realistic training exercises; then another order of magnitude worse than range firing. Soldiers stand the 
most chance of hitting the target on a firing range, less in a realistic exercise and even less when they 
are in a real battle. The errors in the models and data employed in the wargames were not the fault of 
the rule writers. They were, at best, reflections of the military intelligence and analysis available at the 
time of their creation. This included uncertainties, errors, biases and mistakes. All of these flaws, real 
and potential, would have influenced the real dynamics of player decisions to a lesser or greater extent. 
Often at the tactical level they will play a substantial role. This article does not explore what impact 
these errors in the physics of combat had on what the players took away from these various games in 
terms of operational as well as tactical insights. That topic is an area for further research. 
Cold War Operational Front Games: All Wrong? 
As part of wargaming based research I was using the hobby wargame MEGABLITZ to develop a further 
understanding of the hypothetical conflict during the Cold War (Gow, 2004). The game was played on 
a map, and unusually for a hobby game, logistics were a key part of the game, with units of trucks being 
essential to continually resupply the front line with ammunition, fuel etc. If a player did not have 
sufficient supplies, their forces were unable to move and attack. Playing the game rapidly identified that 
even supplementing fuel and food supplies with looting, the Warsaw Pact (Russian coalition) did not 
have enough trucks to support their forces. In 1980 Russian tank division needed 1073 tons per day for 
offensive operations and they were supplied by 1,500 vehicles per division (Dunnigan, 1982). However, 
prior to the Arab Israel War of 1973, they had just 250 per division. The mathematical conclusion is 
that until the mid-1970’s, if the NATO defenders in Europe had fought (forcing the advancing Russians 
to use up supplies), the attack would have run out of supplies in three days. It is likely that the British, 
American, West German and other NATO nations would have seized this opportunity to counter attack 
the out of supply enemy forces, leading to a rapid conclusion to the land war. 
Research by the History of Wargaming Project has found that the majority of the Cold War operational 
level games from this era are still classified, their records lost or otherwise unavailable in defence 
academy or think tank archives. However, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the critical flaw 
in Russian forces was the lack of trucks was not reflected in the wargames. For example, neither the 
British Army Wargame cited in Curry (1956) or Theatrespiel (1965) covered this area. Commentators 
on the Cold War games such as Allen (1987) or Wilson (1968) did not mention this issue. Hobby 
wargames about the central front, from well-respected designers such as James F. Dunnigan, did not 
highlight this weakness in WARSAW Pact forces prior to the mid-1970s’ (Dunnigan, 1973). 
Examination of wargames modelling air and naval operations from the same era supports the evidence 
that some professional wargames of the Cold War had major errors in them. 
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Games on Ukraine Crisis 
All militaries use wargames as part of their planning cycle for potential future conflicts. Understandably 
the current professional wargames are usually not available in the public domain, though summaries 
that are indicative of design and application are available from the Connections series of conferences 
and other public domain sources (Connections UK, 2019). Most professional games are being driven 
by innovation in designs from the hobby space and commercial games companies, such as new methods 
of gaming such as matrix games (Curry & Price, 2014), confrontation analysis (Curry & Young, 2017) 
and role playing. Therefore, if one knows that a particular professional wargame was designed as a 
certain genre of game, then an experienced game designer has a strong outline of the game mechanics 
without access to the actual game materials. 
The Ukraine Crisis from 2014 onwards became the War in Donbass. Fought between the Ukrainian 
government and Russian supported separatists, the conflict become a short high intensity war that after 
numerous cease fire attempts has dwindled to a low-level disputed border conflict with sporadic 
skirmishes. The conflict was anticipated and was gamed prior to the conflict. Without referring to 
classified wargames, it is possible to look at evidence that showed that the wargame models built prior 
to the conflict also had errors in them. The board game Millennium Wars: Ukraine (2003) by one of the 
best-known military board game designers, Joseph Miranda, was published ten years before the actual 
crisis (Miranda, 2003). The game had many interesting features, but the assumptions about the scale of 
the war were completely wrong. The game postulated that Russia would deploy perhaps 150,000 troops 
and NATO would immediately commit an equal sized force. The game mechanisms showed a kinetic 
war similar to that anticipated in the wargames for the Cold War Central Front. The actual conflict 
involved largely small units, new technology such as drones, and both sides strategy included a focus 
on the international opinion, attempting to win the war through dominating social media. 
On the very eve of the war, Brian Train, widely seen as one of the top counter insurgency game 
designers, published a game on March 16, 2014 about the potential conflict (UKRAINE CRISIS, 2014). 
Subsequent changes by the designer to the game to reflect the actions of the real world included 
• Airfields added to Kiev and Odessa to help the Ukrainian parachute brigade to move.
• The geography of the map was changed with the addition of an explicit Sevastopol enclave.
• Expansion of non-kinetic options, as the war was being waged on more than just the battlefield.
The game was according to game designer “half right and half wrong” (TRAIN, 2018). The tentative 
conclusion from these two examples is that even the current generation of wargames are not necessarily 
reliable simulations of conflicts that have not yet occurred. Having shown how a lack of or faulty 
intelligence often drives the failures of games, it is hardly surprising that hobby games are also poor 
predictors. 
Computer Wargames 
Computer wargames are an essential part of military wargaming. For example, flight simulators, tank 
simulators, operational games and tactical combat. It should be noted there are differences between a 
simulation (designed for evaluative or computational purposes) and a game that is designed for 
educational purposes. Whilst having many advantages, it is also recognised that the closed nature of the 
software driving the computer game make it harder to check the under-pinning assumptions (Sabin, 
2012). VIRTUAL BATTLE SPACE 3 (Bohemia Interactive, 2018) is a widely used tactical trainer and 
is based on a commercial computer game engine Arma 3 (Bohemia Interactive, 2013). Used by the 
British Army, Australian Army, New Zealand Army (Bohemia Interactive, 2019), it has undoubted 
training value. My observation of its use show that although the game is run in real time (i.e. if it takes 
5 minutes to move a certain distance in the real world, then the players take 5 minutes to move the same 
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distance in the game world), it does not reflect time accurately for low level combat. As the players are 
interacting with game in a computer laboratory, they are in close physical proximity to the others in 
their team. This allows orders to be given faster, players communicate faster and after an action, such 
as storming a building, they reorganise more rapidly. In real life, soldiers are more spread out, are 
distracted and so communication often takes longer. After storming a building, typically the attackers 
are shaken, their ears ringing, dust and confusion means that sorting them out ready for the next action 
takes far longer than typically happens in VBS 3 games in the classroom. 
 
The value of computer games technology in the military context has been questioned (Whitney et al., 
2013). I analysed a well-established modern computer tactical trainer was for this research. Used to 
depict unit level actions from platoon (30 men) to brigade (3000 men and vehicles) it used individual 
avatars i.e. every soldier, civilian and vehicle is modelled. The issue with this is the time for actions 
was distorted. In the real world, the time for a platoon (30 men) to attack is faster than for a company 
(100 men) or brigade (3000 men). However, in the game, the avatars responded to player orders at the 
same time, potentially misleading the players into how long such actions would take in the real world. 
The same trainer also generalised woods into light and thick woods. From the military perspective, 
woods are more complicated. Mature woods have large trees, but the crucial question is there wide 
enough gaps for vehicles to drive through the woods? Less established woods have smaller trees and 
the crucial question is can armoured vehicles crush these saplings and drive through the woods? UK 
Forestry Commission Woods often have cuttings (gaps) though them in parallel lines, making them 
suitable for vehicles to drive through. This micro level of detail is essential if the game is to teach the 
correct tactical lessons. 
 
The Value of Professional Wargaming 
 
Having raised examples of significant errors in the wargaming rules written to model future conflicts, 
it is necessary to balance this with a summary of the wider academic evidence on the value of such 
games. It should also be noted that the various official practise handbooks of wargaming also offer 
support on the value of wargaming (Birnstiel et al., 2006; MOD, 2017; U.S. Army War College, 2015). 
 
• It has long been realised that the act of designing a wargame, whether boardgame, miniatures 
rules or narrative game, is a way of creating a comprehensive analysis of a situation (Dunnigan, 
1977, Sabin, 2012). The act of building a wargame has a value as an analytical method. Burns 
et al. (2015) went further and stated it can be considered an approach “for exploring complex 
problems, and is a form of applied research” (Burns et al., 2015, p7). 
 
• State level confrontations are complex; at tactical level they included issues of space, time, 
forces; at a strategic level they may also include imponderables such as national will, supply 
chains (logistics), political considerations and international law. Wargames are an established 
way of visualising such complex problems in a single model (Caffrey, 2019; Perla & McGrady, 
2011; Sabin, 2007). 
 
• Given the rise in confrontations and crises facing nation states, particularly those fraught with 
a potentially high cost of failure, it is reasonable to take every opportunity to better prepare 
leaders. Wargames are a way of training decision makers in non-judgemental environment, 
where they can test ideas (Duke & Geurts, 2004; Perla, 1990). 
 
• Having played wargames can be a part of developing the mental agility of leaders to cope. when 
faced by the unexpected in crises (Cancian, 2018). 
 
• The early Prussian Kriegsspiels were clearly a way of the experienced bringing their knowledge 
into the classroom. There is wide evidence that the environment of a game encourages 
participants to share experiences (Brightman and Melissa Dewy’s, 2014). 
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• Participating in a game can be part of the essential team building as preparation
• for a crisis (Caffrey, 2019; Perla, 1990).
• Games are a well-established way of teaching and understanding history (Dunnigan, 1977;
Sabin, 2007, 2012).
• A less obvious point is that games are an invaluable way of developing an understanding of the
other sides (so called Red Team’s) perspective. This value of this should not be underestimated,
as a better understanding of other stakeholder’s world view can help prevent a crisis
inadvertently escalate (Hoffman, 2017).
The games represent the decision spaces and possible consequences of those decisions in ways that are 
valuable experiences for the players. The players learn what information was important to making a 
decision and how to acquire and evaluate that information. 
Conclusions 
It is well established that game designers can build games that are often accurate representations of past 
conflicts. Games can have a wide variety of purposes, such as focussing on political, logistics, decision 
making etc. and hobby game designers have a developed a range of game mechanisms to simulate their 
area of interest. To keep the game playable, designers can abstract or generalise the areas of less interest 
for their purposes. This research into the application and practise of professional wargames, from the 
early days to more recent examples, show that some have included significant errors. The case studies 
of tank combat modelling from the Cold War unequivocally demonstrate substantial inconsistency. 
Professional wargames are valuable tools for the military but not because they are necessarily accurate 
at modelling all (or any) aspects of future warfare. Indeed, the historical record indicates that more often 
than not professional games are flawed in much of their assessment of future outcomes of conflict from 
the lowest to highest levels. The wider academic evidence on the use of games shows they add value to 
training and help practise decision makers in their core role of make decisions under pressure. Gaming 
helps leaders to be better developed, prior to conflict, than typical qualification programs and individual 
study can achieve. What is needed to make better professional games in the future is comprehensive 
studies of large samples of historical professional games to examine how they differed from 
subsequently reality. Historical in this context refers to any game that has been run in the past and is no 
longer used. First it is necessary to identify past errors and their sources before we can both fix those 
and anticipate new ones in the future. Knowing how aspects of games, such as morale, movement, 
combat, politics etc. have been wrong in the past, will allow game designers to be aware of previous 
bias tendencies and mitigate these in future designs. One area of particular importance are geopolitical 
games, where state level issues are gamed, countries policies informed and decision makers trained. 
Knowing what the errors were in historical POL-MIL (Political-military) games could help avoid them 
in the next generation of games about anticipated real world issues. The importance of decision makers 
at nation state level being better prepared through better games is potentially important to us all.  
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